In this paper we propose a philosophical distinction between biological and cognitive domains based on two conditions that are postulated to obtain a useful characterization of cognition: biological grounding and explanatory sufficiency. According to this, we argue that the origin of cognition in natural systems (cognition as we know it) is the result of the appearance of an autonomous system embedded into another more generic one: the whole organism. This basic idea is complemented by another one: the formation and development of this system, in the course of evolution, cannot be understood but as the outcome of a continuous process of interaction between organisms and environment, between different organisms, and, specially, between the very cognitive organisms. Finally, we address the problem of the generalization of a theory of cognition (cognition as it could be) and conclude that this work would imply a grounding work on the problem of the origins developed in the frame of a confluence between both Artificial Life and an embodied Artificial Intelligence.
INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the present century modern science has witnessed an apparently contradictory process. On the one hand, the classical ''field disciplines'' have become fragmented into a variety of significantly specialized subareas with increasingly narrower scopes. On the other hand, heterogeneous scientific communities have developed around multidisciplinary ideas, integrating the different epistemological, methodological, and technological contributions of their members and creating what have been called the sciences of complexity (see Pines, 1987; Cowan, Pines, & Meltzer, 
